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Abstract. This paper gives a thorough critique of the foundations of quantum physics
in its mainstream interpretation (i.e., treating pure states and probability as primitives,
without reference to hidden variables, and without modifications of the quantum laws).
This is achieved by cleanly separating a concise version of the (universally accepted) for-
mal core of quantum physics from the (controversial) interpretation issues. The latter are
primarily related to measurement, but also to questions of existence and of the meaning of
basic concepts like ’state’ and ’particle’. The requirements for good foundations of quantum
physics are discussed.
Main results:
• Born’s rule cannot be valid universally, and must be considered as a scientific law with a
restricted domain of validity.
• If the state of every composite quantum system contains all information that can be
known about this system, it cannot be a pure state in general.
For the discussion of questions related to this paper, please use the discussion forum
https://www.physicsoverflow.org.
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1 Introduction
This paper gives a thorough critique of the foundations of quantum physics in its main-
stream interpretation (i.e., treating pure states and probability as primitives, without ref-
erence to hidden variables, and without modifications of the quantum laws).
This is achieved by cleanly separating a concise version of the (universally accepted) formal
core of quantum physics (described in Section 2) from the (controversial) interpretation
issues. The latter are primarily related to measurement, but also to questions of existence
and of the meaning of basic concepts like ’state’ and ’particle’.
The bridge between the formal core and measurement is Born’s rule, usually assumed to be
valid exactly. It is argued in Section 3 that this assumption cannot be maintained, so that
Born’s rule must be considered as a scientific law with a restricted domain of validity. We
also show that if the state of a composite quantum system contains all information that
can be known about a system, it cannot be a pure state. These are the main new results
of the present paper; they open new possiilities for the foundation of quantum physics.
Section 4 discusses requirements for a foundation of quantum physics free of the major
shortcomings of the traditional interpretations. The final Section 5 gives a preview on the
alternative foundation discussed in later parts of this series [40, 41, 42, 43], that satisfies
these requirements.
To separate the formal core of quantum physics from the interpretation issues we need
to avoid some of the traditional quantum mechanical jargon. In particular, following the
convention of Allahverdyan et al. [2], we add the prefix ”q-” to all traditional quantum
notions that suggest by their name a particular interpretation and hence might confuse
the borderline between theory and interpretation. In particular, the Hermitian operators
usually called ”observables”1 will be called ”q-observables” to distinguish them from ob-
servables in the operational sense of numbers obtainable from observation. Similarly, we
use at places the terms q-expectation and q-probability for the conventional but formally
defined terms expectation and probability.
A number of remarks are addressed to experts and then refer to technical aspects explained
in the references given. However, the bulk of this paper is intended to be nontechnical
and understandable for a wide audience being familiar with some traditional quantum
mechanics. The knowledge of some basic terms from functional analysis is assumed; these
are precisely defined in many mathematics books.
In the bibliography, the number(s) after each reference give the page number(s) where it is
cited.
1This notion appears first in Dirac’s 1930 book [16, p.28], where however, Hermiticity is not required.
Later editions make this restriction.
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2 The traditional foundations of quantum physics
Quantum physics consists of a formal core that is universally agreed upon (basically being
a piece of mathematics with a few meager pointers on how to match it with experimental
reality) and an interpretational halo that remains highly disputed even after more than
90 years of modern quantum physics. The latter is the subject of the interpretation of
quantum mechanics, where many interpretations coexist and compete for the attention
of those interested in what quantum physics really means.
To set the stage, I give here an axiomatic introduction to the undisputed formal core.
As in any axiomatic setting (necessary for a formal discipline), there are a number of
different but equivalent sets of axioms or postulates that can be used to define formal
quantum physics. Since they are equivalent, their choice is a matter of convenience.
My choice presented here is the formulation which gives most direct access to statistical
mechanics but is free from allusions to measurement. The reason for the first is that
statistical mechanics is the main tool for applications of quantum physics to the macroscopic
systems we are familiar with. The reason for the second is that real measurements consitute
a complex process involving macroscopic detectors, hence should be explained by quantum
statistical mechanics rather than be part of the axiomatic foundations themselves. (This is
in marked contrast to other foundations, and distinguishes the present system of axioms.)
The relativistic case is outside the scope of the axioms to be presented, as it must be treated
by quantum field theory (see the discussion in Part II [40] of this sequence of papers). Thus
the axioms described in the following present nonrelativistic quantum statistical mechanics
in the Schro¨dinger picture. (As explained later, the traditional starting point is instead the
special case of this setting where all states are assumed to be pure.)
A second reason for my choice is to emphasise the similarity of quantum mechanics and
classical mechanics. Indeed, the only difference between classical and quantum mechanics
in the axiomatic setting presented below is the following:
• The classical case only works with diagonal operators, where all operations happen point-
wise on the diagonal elements. Thus multiplication is commutative, and one can identify
operators and functions. In particular, the density operator degenerates into a probability
density.
• The quantum case allows for noncommutative operators, hence both q-observables and
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the density are (usually infinite-dimensional) matrices.
2.1 Postulates for the formal core of quantum physics
Traditional quantum physics is governed by the following six axioms (A1)–(A6).2 Note that
all axioms are basis-independent. h¯ is Planck’s constant, and is often set to 1.
(A1) A generic system (e.g., a ’hydrogen molecule’) is defined by specifying a Hilbert
space H and a densely defined, self-adjoint3 linear operator H called the Hamiltonian or
the internal energy.
(A2) A particular system (e.g., ’the ion in the ion trap on this particular desk’) is char-
acterized by its state ρ(t) at every time t ∈ R (the set of real numbers). Here ρ(t) is a
Hermitian, positive semidefinite, linear trace class operator on H satisfying at all times the
normalization condition
Tr ρ(t) = 1.
Here Tr denotes the trace.
(A3) A system is called closed in a time interval [t1, t2] if it satisfies the evolution equation
d
dt
ρ(t) =
i
h¯
[ρ(t), H ] for t ∈ [t1, t2], (1)
and open otherwise. If nothing else is apparent from the context, a system is assumed to
be closed.
(A4) Besides the internal energy H , certain other densely defined, self-adjoint opera-
tors or vectors of such operators are distinguished as quantum observables, short q-
observables. (E.g., the q-observables for a system of N distinguishable particles conven-
tionally include for each particle several 3-dimensional vectors: the position xa, momen-
tum pa, orbital angular momentum La and the spin vector (or Bloch vector) Sa of
the particle with label a. If u is a 3-vector of unit length then u ·pa, u ·La and u ·Sa define
the momentum, orbital angular momentum, and spin of particle a in direction u.)
(A5) For any particular system, and for every vector X of self-adjoint q-observables with
commuting components, one associates a time-dependent monotone linear functional 〈·〉t
defining the q-expectation
〈f(X)〉t := Tr ρ(t)f(X)
2The statements of my axioms contain in parentheses some additional explanations that, strictly speak-
ing, are not part of the axioms but make them more easily intelligible; the list of examples given only has
illustrative character and is far from being exhaustive.
3 Self-adjoint operators are Hermitian, H∗ = H . Hermitian operators have a real spectrum if and only if
they are self-adjoint. Hermitian trace class operators are always self-adjoint. The Hille–Yosida theorem says
that eiX exists (and is unitary) for a Hermitian operator X if and only if X is self-adjoint; see Thirring
[59] or Reed & Simon [51].
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of bounded continuous functions f(X) at time t. (By Whittle [65], this is equivalent to a
multivariate probability measure dµt(X) on a suitable σ-algebra over the spectrum SpecX
of X defined by ∫
dµt(X)f(X) := Tr ρ(t)f(X) = 〈f(X)〉t.
This σ-algebra is uniquely determined, and defines q-probabilities.)
(A6) Quantum mechanical predictions consist of predicting properties (typically q-expecta-
tions or conditional q-probabilities) of the measures defined in Axiom (A5), given reasonable
assumptions about the states (e.g., ground state, equilibrium state, etc.)
Axiom (A6) specifies that the formal content of quantum physics is covered exactly by what
can be deduced from Axioms (A1)–(A5) without anything else added – except for restric-
tions defining the specific nature of the states and q-observables, for example specifying com-
mutation or anticommutation relations between some of the distinguished q-observables).
Thus Axiom (A6) says that Axioms (A1)–(A5) are complete.
The description of a particular closed system is therefore given by the specification of a
particular Hilbert space (in (A1)), the specification of the q-observables (in (A4)), and the
specification of conditions singling out a particular class of states (in (A6)). (The description
of an open system involves, in addition, the specification of details of the dynamical law.)
Given this, everything predictable in principle about the system is determined by the theory,
and hence is predicted by the theory.
At the level of the formal core, q-expectations and all other concepts introduced are only
calculational tools that enables one to predict numerical values for theoretical objects with
suggestive names. Their precise relation to experimental reality is not specified by the
formal core. These relations are the subject matter of the interpretation of quantum me-
chanics; see Subsection 2.4.
2.2 The pure state idealization
A state ρ is called pure at time t if ρ(t) maps the Hilbert space H to a 1-dimensional
subspace, and mixed otherwise.
Although much of traditional quantum physics is phrased in terms of pure states, this is a
very special case; in most actual experiments the systems are open and the states are mixed
states. Pure states are relevant only if they come from the ground state of a Hamiltonian
in which the first excited state has a large energy gap. Indeed, assume for simplicity that
H has a discrete spectrum. In an orthonormal basis of eigenstates φk, functions f(H) of
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the Hamiltonian H are defined by
f(H) =
∑
k
f(Ek)φkφ
∗
k
whenever the function f is defined on the spectrum. The equilibrium density is the canonical
ensemble,
ρ(T ) = Z(T )−1e−H/k¯T = Z(T )−1
∑
k
e−Ek/Tφkφ
∗
k;
here k¯ is the Boltzmann constant. (Of course, equating this ensemble with equilibrium
in a closed system is an additional step beyond our system of axioms, which would require
justification.) Since the trace equals 1, we find
Z(T ) =
∑
k
e−Ek/k¯T ,
the textbook formula for the so-called partition function. In the limit T → 0, all terms
e−Ek/T become 0 or 1, with 1 only for the k corresponding to the states with least energy.
Thus, if the ground state φ1 is unique,
lim
T→0
ρ(T ) = φ1φ
∗
1
.
This implies that for low enough temperatures, the equilibrium state is approximately pure.
The larger the gap to the second smallest energy level, the better is the approximation at
a given nonzero temperature. In particular, the approximation is good if the energy gap
exceeds a small multiple of E∗ := k¯T .
States of sufficiently simple systems (i.e., those with a few energy levels only) can often be
prepared in nearly pure states, by realizing a source governed by a Hamiltonian in which the
first excited state has a much larger energy than the ground state. Dissipation then brings
the system into equilibrium, and as seen above, the resulting equilibrium state is nearly
pure. Those low lying excited states for which a selection rule suppresses the transition to
a lower energy state can be made nearly pure in the same way.
2.3 Schro¨dinger equation and Born’s rule
To see how the more traditional setting in terms of the Schro¨dinger equation arises, we
consider the special case of a closed system in a pure state ρ(t) at some time t. The state
vector of such a system at time t is by definition a unit vector ψ(t) in the range of the
pure state ρ(t). It is determined up to a phase factor (of absolute value 1), and one easily
verifies that
ρ(t) = ψ(t)ψ(t)∗. (2)
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Remarkably, under the dynamics for a closed system specified in the above axioms, this
property persists with time if the system is closed, and the state vector satisfies the time-
dependent Schro¨dinger equation
ih¯ψ˙(t) = Hψ(t)
Thus the state remains pure at all times. Conversely, for every pure state, the phases of
ψ(t) at all times t can be chosen such that the Schro¨dinger equation holds; the density
operator is independent of this phase.
Moreover, if X is a vector of q-observables with commuting components and the spectrum
of X is discrete, then the measure from Axiom (A5) is discrete,
∫
dµ(X)f(X) =
∑
k
pkf(Xk)
with spectral valuesXk and nonnegative numbers pk summing to 1, called q-probabilities.
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Associated with the pk are eigenspaces Hk such that
Xψ = Xkψ for ψ ∈ Hk,
and H is the direct sum of the Hk. Therefore, every state vector ψ can be uniquely decom-
posed into a sum
ψ =
∑
k
ψk, ψk ∈ Hk.
ψk is called the projection of ψ to the eigenspace Hk. If all eigenvalues of X are discrete
and nondegenerate, each Hk is 1-dimensional and spanned by a normalized eigenvector φk
Then Xφk = Xkφk and the projection is given by ψk = Pkψ with the orthogonal projector
Pk := φkφ
∗
k, so that
ψ =
∑
k
φkφ
∗
kψ.
A short calculation using Axiom (A5) now reveals that for a pure state (2), the q-probabilities
pk are given by the formal Born rule
pk = |ψk(t)|
2 = |φ∗kψ(t)|
2, (3)
where ψk(t) is the projection of ψ(t) to the eigenspace Hk.
Identifying these q-probabilities with the probabilities of measurement results (which is
already an interpretative step involving (MI) below) constitutes the so-called Born rule.
Without this identification, the formal Born rule (3) is just a piece of uninterpreted math-
ematics with suggestive naming.
4This leaves open the precise physical meaning of q-probabilities, and the question of how to measure
them. This is the price to pay for not entering into interpretational issues.
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Deriving the formal Born rule (3) from Axioms (A1)–(A5) makes it feel completely natural,
while the traditional approach starting with Born’s rule makes it an irreducible rule full of
mystery and only justifiable by its miraculous agreement with certain experiment.
2.4 Interpreting the formal core
In addition to the formal axioms (A1)–(A6), one needs a rudimentary interpretation relating
the formal part to experiments. The following minimal interpretation seems to be
universally accepted.
(MI) Upon measuring at times tl (l = 1, ..., n) a vector X of q-observables with commuting
components, for a large collection of independent identical (particular) systems closed for
times t < tl, all in the same state
ρ(tl) = ρ (l = 1, ..., n)
(one calls such systems identically prepared), the measurement results are statistically
consistent with independent realizations of a random vector X with measure as defined in
axiom (A5).
Note that (MI) is no longer a formal statement since it neither defines what measuring is,
nor what measurement results are and what statistically consistent or independent
identical system means. Thus (MI) has no mathematical meaning – it is not an axiom,
but already part of the interpretation of formal quantum physics.
(MI) relates the axioms to a nonphysical entity, the social conventions of the community
of physicists. The terms ’measuring’, ’measurement results’, and ’statistically consistent’
already have informal meaning in the reality as perceived by a physicist. Everything stated
in Axiom (MI) is understandable by every trained physicist. Thus statement (MI) is not
an axiom for formal logical reasoning but a bridge to informal reasoning in the traditional
cultural setting that defines what a trained physicist understands by reality.
The lack of precision in statement (MI) is on purpose, since it allows the statement to be
agreeable to everyone in its vagueness; different philosophical schools can easily fill it with
their own understanding of the terms in a way consistent with the remainder.
Interpretational axioms necessarily have this form, since they must assume some unex-
plained common cultural background for perceiving reality. (This is even true in pure
mathematics, since the language stating the axioms must be assumed to be common cul-
tural background.)
(MI) is what every traditional interpretation I know of assumes at least implicitly in order
to make contact with experiments. Indeed, all traditional interpretations I know of assume
much more, but they differ a lot in what they assume beyond (MI).
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However, my critique of the universal Born rule in Subsection 3.3 also applies to (MI),
since (MI) implies the universal Born rule. Thus (MI) seems to be justified only for certain
measurements.
Everything beyond (MI) seems to be controversial; cf. Schlosshauer cite[Chapter
8]Schl,Schl.book. In particular, already what constitutes a measurement of X is controver-
sial. (E.g., reading a pointer, different readers may get marginally different results. What
is the true pointer reading? Does passing a beam splitter or a polarization filter constitute
a measurement?)
On the other hand there is an informal consensus on how to perform measurements in prac-
tice. Good foundations including a good measurement theory should be able to properly
justify this informal consensus by defining additional formal concepts about what consti-
tutes measurement. To be satisfying, these must behave within the theory just as their
informal relatives with the same name behave in reality. The goal of the thermal inter-
pretation described in Part II [40] and applied to measurement in Part III [41] and Part
IV [42] is to provide such foundations. Its link of the formal core to experiment is different
from (MI), based instead on the link between quantum physics and thermodynamics known
from statistical mechanics.
3 A critique of Born’s rule
Traditionally, some version of Born’s rule is considered to be an indispensable part of any
interpretation of quantum mechanics, either as a postulate, or as a result derived from other
postulates, not always on the basis of convincing reasoning. In this section, we have a close
look at the possible forms of Born’s rule and discuss the limits of its validity.
All traditional foundations of quantum mechanics heavily depend on the concept of (hy-
pothetical, idealized) experiments – far too heavily. This is one of the reasons why these
foundations are still unsettled, over 90 years after the discovery of the basic equations for
modern quantum mechanics. No other theory has such controversial foundations.
The main reason is that the starting point of the usual interpretations is an idealization
of the measurement process that is taken too seriously, namely as the indisputable truth
about everything measured. But in reality, this idealization is only a didactical trick for
the newcomer to make the formal definitions of quantum mechanics a bit easier to swallow.
Except in a few very simple cases, it is too far removed from experimental practice to
tell much about real measurement, and hence about how quantum physics is used in real
applications.
In experimental physics, measurement is a very complex thing – far more complex than
Born’s rule (the usual starting point) suggests. To measure the distance between two
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galaxies, the mass of the top quark, or the Lamb shift – just to mention three basic examples
- cannot be captured by the idealistic measurement concept used there, nor by any of the
refinements of it discussed in the literature.
In each of the three cases mentioned, one assembles a lot of auxiliary information and
ultimately calculates the measurement result from a best fit of a model to the data. Clearly
the theory must already be in place in order to do that. We do not even know what a top
quark should be whose mass we are measuring unless we have a theory that tells us this!
The two most accurately determined observables in the history of quantum physics, namely
the anomalous magnetic moment of the electron and Lamb shift, are not even q-observables!
To present the stage for the criticism of Born’s rule in Subsection 3.3, and related criticism
in Subsections 3.4– 3.6, we first need to clarify the meaning of the term ”Born’s rule”. To
distinguish different useful meanings we look in Subsections 3.1– 3.2 at the early history of
Born’s rule.
3.1 Early, measurement-free formulations of Born’s rule
It is interesting to consider the genesis of Born’s rule,5 based on the early papers of the
pioneers of quantum mechanics. This and the next subsection benefitted considerably from
discussions with Francois Ziegler, though his view of the history is somewhat different (cf.
Ziegler [73]).
The two 1926 papers by Born [8, 9] (the first being a summary of the second) introduced
the probabilistic interpretation that earned Born the 1954 Nobel prize. Born’s 1926 formu-
lation6 ”gives the probability for the electron, arriving from the z-direction, to be thrown out
into the direction designated by the angles α, β, γ, with the phase change δ” does not de-
pend on anything being measured, let alone to be assigned a precise numerical measurement
value! Instead it sounds like talk about objective properties of electrons (”being thrown
out”) independent of measurement. Thus Born originally did not relate his interpretation
to measurement but to objective properties of scattering processes, no matter whether these
were observed.
Rephrased in modern terminology (Born didn’t have the concept of an S-matrix), Born’s
statement above is made precise (and generalized) by the following rule:
5apparently named such first in 1934 by Bauer [5, p.302] (”la re`gle de Born”). Before that, during
the gestation period of finding the right level of generalization and interpretation, the pioneers talked more
vaguely about Born’s interpretation of quantum mechanics (or of the wave function). For example, Jordan
[28, p.811] writes about ”Born’s Deutung der Lo¨sung [der] Schro¨dingergleichung”.
6German original, Born [8, p.865f]: ”bestimmt die Wahrscheinlichkeit dafu¨r, daß das aus der z-Richtung
kommende Elektron in die durch α, β, γ bestimmte Richtung (und mit einer Phasena¨nderung δ) geworfen
wird”
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Born’s rule (scattering form): In a scattering experiment described by the S-matrix S,
Pr(ψout|ψin) := |ψ
∗
out
Sψin|
2
is the conditional probability density that scattering of particles prepared in the in-state
ψin results in particles in the out-state ψout. Here the in- and out-states are asymptotic
eigenstates of total momentum, labelled by a maximal collection of independent quantum
numbers (including particle momenta and spins).
The scattering form of Born’s rule is impeccable and remains until today the basis of the
interpretation of S-matrix elements computed from quantum mechanics or quantum field
theory.
The 1927 paper by Born [10] extends this rule on p.173 to probabilities for quantum jumps
(”Quantensprung”, p.172) between energy eigenstates, given by the absolute squares of in-
ner products of the corresponding eigenstates, still using objective rather than measurement-
based language:7 For a system initially in state n given by Born’s (9), ”the square |bnm|
2
is according to our basic hypothesis the probability for the system to be in state m after
completion of the interaction”. Here state n is the nth stationary state (eigenstate with a
time-dependent harmonic phase) of the Hamiltonian.
Born derives this rule from two assumptions. The first assumption, made on p.170 and
repeated on p.171 after (5), is that an atomic system is always in a definite stationary
state:8 ”Thus we shall preserve the picture of Bohr that an atomic system is always in a
unique stationary state. [...] but in general we shall know in any moment only that, based
on the prior history and the physical conditions present, there is a certain probability that
the atom is in the nth state.”
Thus for the early Born, the beables of a quantum mechanical system are the quantum
numbers of the (proper or improper) stationary states of the system. This assumption works
indeed for equilibrium quantum statistical mechanics – where expectations are defined in
terms of the partition function and a probability distribution over the stationary states.
It also works for nondegenerate quantum scattering theory – where only asymptotic states
figure. However, it has problems in the presence of degeneracy, where only the eigenspaces,
but not the stationary states themselves, have well-defined quantum numbers. Indeed,
[10] assumes – on p.159, remark after (2) and Footnote 2 – that the Hamiltonian has a
nondegenerate, discrete spectrum.
7”Das Quadrat |bnm|
2 ist gema¨ß unserer Grundhypothese die Wahrscheinlichkeit dafu¨r, daß das System
sich nach Ablauf der Sto¨rung im Zustand m befindet”
8”Wir werden also an dem Bohrschen Bilde festhalten, daß ein atomares System stets nur in einem
stationaren Zustand ist. [...] im allgemeinen aber werden wir in einem Augenblick nur wissen, daß auf
Grund der Vorgeschichte und der bestehenden physikalischen Bedingungen eine gewisse Wahrscheinlichkeit
dafu¨r besteht, daß das Atom im n-ten Zustand ist.”
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Born’s second assumption is his basic hypothesis on p.171 for probabilities for being (objec-
tively) in a stationary state:9 ”there is a certain probability that the atom is in the nth state.
We now claim that as measure for this probability of state, one must choose the quantity
|cn|
2 = |
∫
ψ(x, t)ψ∗n(x)dx|
2.”
The 1927 paper by Jordan [28, p.811] (citing Pauli) extends Born’s second assumption fur-
ther to an objective, measurement independent probability interpretation of inner products
(probability amplitudes) of eigenstates of two arbitrary operators, seemingly without being
aware of the conceptual problem this objective view poses when applied to noncommuting
operators.
The 1927 paper by Pauli [50, p.83,Footnote 1] contains the first formal statement of a prob-
ability interpretation for position:10 ”We shall interpret this function in the spirit of Born’s
view of the ”Gespensterfeld” in [8, 9] as follows: |ψ(q1 . . . qf )|
2dq1 . . . dqf is the probability
that, in the named quantum state of the system, these coordinates lie simultaneously in the
named volume element dq1 . . . dqf of position space.” Apart from its objective formulation
(no reference to measurement), this is a special case of the universal formulation of Born’s
rule given below:
The 1927 paper by von Neumann [45, p.45] generalizes this statement to arbitrary selfad-
joint operators, again stated as an objective (i.e., measurement independent) interpretation.
For discrete energy spectra and their energy levels, we still read p.48: ”unquantized states
are impossible” (”nicht gequantelte Zusta¨nde sind unmo¨glich”).
Note that like Born, Jordan and von Neumann both talk about objective properties of the
system independent of measurement. But unlike Born who ties these properties to the
stationary state representation in which momentum and energy act diagonally, Pauli ties
it to the position representation, where position acts diagonally, and von Neumann allows
it for arbitrary systems of commuting selfadjoint operators.
From either Born’s or Jordan’s statement one can easily obtain the following, basis-indepen-
dent form of Born’s rule, either for functions A of stationary state labels, or for functions
A of position:
Born’s rule (objective expectation form): The value of a q-observable corresponding
to a self-adjoint Hermitian operator A of a system in the pure state ψ (or the mixed state
ρ) equals on average the q-expectation value 〈A〉 := ψ∗Aψ (resp. 〈A〉 := Tr ρA).
The first published statement of this kind seems to be in the 1927 paper by Landau
9”[...] eine gewisse Wahrscheinlichkeit dafu¨r besteht, daß das Atom im n-ten Zustand ist. Wir behaupten
nun, daß als Maß dieser Zustandswahrscheinlichkeit die Gro¨ße |cn|
2 = |
∫
ψ(x, t)ψ∗n(x)dx|
2 zu wa¨hlen ist.”
10”Wir wollen diese [...] Funktion im Sinne der von Born in seiner Stoßmechanik [here he cites [8, 9]]
vertretenen Auffassung des ”Gespensterfeldes” folgendermaßen deuten: Es ist |ψ(q1 . . . qf )|
2dq1 . . . dqf die
Wahrscheinlichkeit dafu¨r, daß im betreffenden Quantenzustand des Systems diese Koordinaten sich zugleich
im betreffenden Volumenelement dq1 . . . dqf des Lageraums befinden.”
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[32, (4a),(5)]. The interpretational part is in Footnote 2 there, which states that (the
formula corresponding in modern notation to 〈A〉 := Tr ρA) denotes the probability mean
(”Wahrscheinlichkeitsmittelwert”). Again there is no reference to measurement.
3.2 Formulations of Born’s rule in terms of measurement
As pointed out by Weyl [63, p.2], the derivation from Born’s and Jordan’s statement does
not extend to general operators A, due to noncommutativity and the resulting comple-
mentarity. Another consequence of this noncommutativity is that Born’s stationary state
probability interpretation and Pauli’s position probability density interpretation cannot
both claim objective status. Therefore, later interpretations relate the notion of value of
an observable (being in the n-state, or having position r) more directly to measurement.
The 1927 paper by von Neumann [46], after having noted (on p. 248) the problems
resulting from noncommuting quantities that cannot be observed simultaneously, derives
axiomatically on p.255 he derives for a theoretical expectation value with natural properties
the necessity of the formula 〈A〉 := Tr ρA with Hermitian ρ (his U) of trace 1. This is
abstract mathematical reasoning independent of any relation to measurement, and hence
belongs to the formal (uninterpreted) core of quantum physics. However, the motivation
for his axioms, and hence their interpretation, is taken from a consideration on p.247 of
the measurement of values in an ensemble of systems, taking the expectation to be the
ensemble mean of the measured values. Specialized to a uniform (”einheitlich”) ensemble
of systems in the same completely known (pure) state ψ of norm one he then finds on p.258
that ρ = ψψ∗, giving 〈A〉 := ψ∗Aψ.
In the present terminology, we may phrase von Neumann’s interpretation of q-expectation
values as follows:
Born’s rule (measured expectation form): If a q-observable corresponding to a self-
adjoint Hermitian operator A is measured on a system in the pure state ψ (or the mixed state
ρ), the results equal on average the q-expectation value 〈A〉 := ψ∗Aψ (resp. 〈A〉 := Tr ρA).
Note that the q-expectation value has a formal meaning independent of the interpretation;
the measured expectation form of Born’s rule just asserts that measurements result in a
random variable whose expectation agrees with the formal q-expectation. To justify the
”equal”, the average in question cannot be a sample average (where only an approximate
equal results, with an accuraccy depending on size and independence of the sample) but
must be considered as the theoretical expectation value of the random variable.
On a purist note, we can only take finitely many measurements on a system. But the
expectation value of a random variable is insensitive to the result of a finite number of
realizations. Thus, in the most stringent sense, the expectation form of Born’s rule says
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nothing at all about measurement. However, the content of the expectation form is roughly
the content of the more carefully formulated statement (MI) discussed in Subsection 2.4,
specialized to a pure state. (MI) does not have the defect just mentioned.
More conventionally, Born’s rule is phrased in terms of measurement results and their
probabilities rather than expectations. As part of Born’s rule, it is usually stated (see,
e.g., [68]) that the results of the measurement of a q-observable exactly equals one of the
eigenvalues.
A precise basic form of Born’s rule (often augmented by a more controversial collapse
statement about the state after a measurement11 not discussed here) is the following, taken
almost verbatim from Wikipedia [68].
Born’s rule (discrete form): If a q-observable corresponding to a self-adjoint Hermitian
operator A with discrete spectrum is measured in a system described by a pure state with
normalized wave function ψ then
(i) the measured result will be one of the eigenvalues λ of A, and
(ii) the probability of measuring a given eigenvalue λi equals ψ
∗Piψ, where Pi is the pro-
jection onto the eigenspace of A corresponding to λi.
A related statement is claimed to hold for arbitrary spectra with a continuous part, gener-
alizing both the discrete form and the original form.
Born’s rule (universal form):12 If a q-observable corresponding to a self-adjoint Hermi-
tian operator A is measured in a system described by a pure state with normalized wave
function ψ then
(i) the measured result will be one of the eigenvalues λ of A, and
(ii) for any open interval Λ of real numbers, the probability of measuring λ ∈ Λ equals
ψ∗P (Λ)ψ, where P (Λ) is the projection onto the invariant subspace of A corresponding by
the spectral theorem to the spectrum in Λ.
If the measurement result λi is an isolated eigenvalue of A, the universal form reduces to
11For example, in his famous 1930 book, Dirac [16, p.49] states: ”The state of the system after the
observation must be an eigenstate of [the observable] α, since the result of a measurement of α for this state
must be a certainty.” In the third edition [17, p.36], he writes: ”Thus after the first measurement has been
made, the system is in an eigenstate of the dynamical variable ξ, the eigenvalue it belongs to being equal
to the result of the first measurement. This conclusion must still hold if the second measurement is not
actually made. In this way we see that a measurement always causes the system to jump into an eigenstate
of the dynamical variable that is being measured, the eigenvalue this eigenstate belongs to being equal to the
result of the measurement.”
A 2007 source is Schlosshauer [56], who takes the collapse (”jump into an eigenstate”) to be part of
what he calls the ”standard interpretation” of quantum mechanics, but does not count it as part of Born’s
rule (p.35). On the other hand, Landau & Lifschitz [33, Section 7] explicitly remark that the state after
the measurement is in general not an eigenstate.
12 The quantum field theory book by Weinberg [61] pays on p.50 (2.1.7) lip service to the universal
form of Born’s rule. But the only place where Born’s rule is used is on p.135 (3.4.7), where instead the
scattering form is employed to get the transition rates for scattering processes. Thus quantum field theory
only relies on the scattering form of Born’s rule.
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the discrete form, since one can take Λ to be an open interval intersecting the spectrum in
λi only, and in this case, P (Λ) = Pi.
Using the spectral theorem, it is not difficult to show that the universal form of Born’s
rule implies the measured expectation form. Conversely, the measured expectation form of
Born’s rule almost implies the universal form. It fully implies the second part (ii), from
which it follows that the first part (i) holds with probability 1 (but not with certainty, as
the universal form claims).13
Unfortunately, the application of Born’s rule to measurement problems in general is highly
questionable. Because of the equivalence just mentioned, it is enough to discuss the uni-
versal form of Born’s rule.
3.3 Limitations of Born’s rule
Though usually stated as universally valid, Born’s rule has severe limitations. In the uni-
versal form, it neither applies to photodetection nor to the measurement of the total energy,
just to mention the most conspicuous misfits. Moreover, equating the results of measure-
ments with exact eigenvalues is very questionable when the latter are irrational or (as in
the case of angular momentum) multiples of a not exactly known constant of nature. In
addition, real measurements rarely produce exact numbers (as Born’s rule would require
it) but (cf. [48]) numbers that are themselves subject to uncertainty. Because of these lim-
itations and the inherent ambiguities in specifying what constitutes a measurement14 and
what qualifies as a measurement result, subsequent derivations can never claim universal
validity either.
Problems with Born’s rule include:
1. At energies below the dissociation threshold (i.e., where the spectrum of the Hamil-
tonian H , the associated q-observable, is discrete), energy measurements of a system
almost never yield an exact eigenvalue of H . For example, nobody knows the exact
value of the Lamb shift, a difference of eigenvalues of the Hamiltonian of the hydrogen
atom; the (reasonably) precise measurement was even worth a Nobel prize (1955 for
13 This is not just hair splitting. The difference between probability 1 and certainty can be seen by
noting that the probability that a random number drawn uniformly from [0, 1] is irrational with probability
1, while measurements usually produce rational numbers.
In general, the expectation form certainly allows finitely many exceptions to (i), and hence says, strictly
speaking, nothing at all about the possible measurement results. (This is well illustrated in the story ”The
Metaphysian’s Nightmare” by the logician Bertrand Russell [53]: ”There is a special department of Hell
for students of probability. In this department there are many typewriters and many monkeys. Every time
that a monkey walks on a typewriter, it types by chance one of Shakespeare’s sonnets.”) However, the
application to spin measurements and to quantum information theory requires that (i) holds at least for
binary spectra. Hence the expectation form is slightly deficient.
14This is a highly nontrivial problem in quantum statistical mechanics; cf. Allahverdyan et al. [1].
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Willis Lamb). Indeed, the energy levels of most realistic quantum systems are only
inaccurately known.
2. In particular, Born’s rule does not apply to the total energy of a composite system,
one of the key q-observables15 in quantum physics, since the spectrum is usually very
narrowly spaced and precise energy levels are known only for the simplest systems
in the simplest approximations. Therefore Born’s rule cannot be used to justify the
canonical ensemble formalism of statistical mechanics; it can at best motivate it.
3. The same holds for the measurement of masses of relativistic particles with 4-momen-
tum p, which never yield exact eigenvalues of the mass operator M :=
√
p2. Indeed,
the masses of most particles are only inaccurately known.
4. When a particle has been prepared in an ion trap (and hence is there with certainty),
Born’s rule implies a tiny but positive probability that at an arbitrarily short time
afterwards it is detected a light year away.16 In a similar spirit, Heisenberg [24,
p.25] wrote in 1930:17 ”This result is stranger than it seems at first glance. As is well
known, ψ∗ψ diminishes exponentially with increasing distance from the nucleus; there
is thus always a small but finite probability of finding the electron at a great distance
from the center of the atom.” Thus |ψ(x)|2 cannot be the exact probability density
for being detected at x.
5. This argument against the exact probability density interpretation of |ψ(x)|2 works
even for relativistic particles in the multiparticle framework of Keister & Polyzou
[29].
6. A no-go theorem for exact measurement by Wigner [67] rules out projective mea-
surements of a particle being in a given region, since the corresponding projector does
not commute with all additive conserved quantities. See also Ozawa [49] and Araki
& Yanase [3].
7. Many measurements in quantum optics are POVM measurements [69], i.e., described
by a positive operator-valued measure. These follow a different law of which Born’s
rule is just a very special case where the POVM is actually projection-valued. (In
general, the POVM law can be derived from Born’s rule applied to a fictitious von
Neumann experiment in an extended Hilbert space. This shows its consistency with
15”we shall assume the energy of any dynamical system to be always an observable” (Dirac [16, p.38])
16 Indeed, for a single massive particle, Born’s rule states that |ψ(x, t)|2 is the probability density for
locating at a given time t the particle at a particular position x anywhere in the universe, and the Fourier
transform |ψ˜(p, t)|2 is the probability density for locating at a given time t the particle with a particular
momentum p. In the present case, the position density has bounded support, so by a basic theorem of
harmonic analysis, the momentum density must have unbounded support. This implies the claim.
17German original: ”Das Resultat ist aber merkwu¨rdiger, als es im ersten Augenblick den Anschein hat.
Bekanntlich nimmt ψ∗ψ exponentiell mit wchsendem Abstand vom Atomkern ab. Also besteht immer noch
eine endliche Wahrscheinlichkeit dafu¨r, das Elektron in sehr weitem Abstand vom Atomkern zu finden.”
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Born’s rule but still disproves the latter for the actual physical states in the smaller
physical Hilbert space.)
8. Born’s rule does not cover the multitude of situations where typically only single
measurements of a q-observable are made. In particular, Born’s rule does not apply
to typical macroscopic measurements, whose essentially deterministic predictions are
derived from statistical mechanics.
9. The measurement of quantum fields is not covered by Born’s rule. These are q-
observables depending on a space-time argument, and one can prepare or measure
events at any particular space-time position at most once. Thus it is impossible to re-
peat measurements, and the standard statistical interpretation in terms of sufficiently
many identically prepared systems is impossible.
10. Many things physicists measure have no simple interpretation in terms of a Born
measurement. Examples include spectral lines and widths, particle masses and life
times, chemical reaction rates, or scattering cross sections. Often lots of approximate
computations are involved.
To uphold Born’s rule in view of points 1.-3., one would have to consider the concept of
measurement that of a fictitious, infinitely precise measurement.18
Points 4 and 5 above imply that the wave function and hence the density operator encode in
their basic operational interpretation highly nonlocal information. Thus nonlocality is ex-
plicitly built into the very foundations of quantum mechanics as conventionally presented.
Processing nonlocal information, it is no surprise that standard quantum mechanics de-
fined by the Schro¨dinger equation violates the conclusions of Bell type theorems (cf. the
discussion and references in Neumaier [37]). It already violates their assumptions!
Points 4 and 5 also show that at finite times (i.e., outside its use to interpret asymptotic
S-matrix elements), Born’s rule cannot be strictly true in relativistic quantum field theory,
and hence not in nature.
3.4 The domain of validity of Born’s rule
As we have seen, Born’s rule has, like any other statement in physics, its domain of validity
but leads to problems when applied outside this domain.19 From an analysis of many dif-
ferent q-observables and measurement protocols, it seems that the discrete form of Born’s
18In particular, this would exclude a subjective interpretation of measurement results and associated
probabilities in terms of the experimenter’s knowledge.
19Progressing from the Born rule to so-called positive operator valued measures (POVMs) is already a
big improvement, commonly used in quantum optics and quantum information theory. These are adequate
for measurements in the form of clicks, flashes or events (particle tracks) in scattering experiments, and
perhaps only then.
But these still do not cover measurements of energy, or of the Lamb shift, or of particle form factors.
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rule needs four conditions for its validity. It is valid precisely for measuring q-observables
1. with only discrete spectrum,
2. measured over and over again in identical states (to make sense of the probabilities),
where
3. the difference of adjacent eigenvalues is significantly larger than the measurement reso-
lution, and where
4. the measured value is adjusted to exactly match the spectrum, which must be known
exactly prior to the measurement.
The universal version has similar limitations also when restricted to purely continuous
spectra; in this case it seems to be valid only in Born’s original scattering form.
3.5 What is a state?
In physics, the state of a physical system (whether classical or quantum) gives a complete
description of the system at a given time. The following is a concise formulation of this:
(S1) The state of a system (at a given time) encodes everything that can be said (or ”can
be known”) about the system at this time, including the possible predictions at later times,
and nothing else.
Thus every property of the system can (in principle) be computed from its state.
For a complex system, knowledge about the whole system is usually obtained by collecting
knowledge about its various parts. This makes sense only if we require in addition,
(S2) Every property of a subsystem is also a property of the whole system.
Indeed, not knowing something about the subsystem means not knowing everything about
the system as a whole, and hence not knowing the precise state of the system.
Thus common sense dictates that a sound, observer-independent interpretation of quantum
physics should satisfy (S1) and (S2).
Now (S2) says that the state of the full system determines all properties of any of its
subsystems. hence it determines by (S1) the state of each subsystem to the last detail.
Thus we conclude:
(S3) The state of a system determines the state of all its subsystems.
A macroscopic body should therefore have a valid microscopic quantum description – a
quantum state – that determines all observable properties on every level. In particular,
an approximate hydromechanical classical description for the most important observable
properties, namely the q-expectation values of the fields, must be obtainable from this
exact quantum state. (The process to achieve this is usually called coarse graining.)
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Property (S3) must hold for logical reasons even though in practice we may never know the
precise state of the system and/or the subsystems. Indeed, we usually know only very little
information about any system, unless the latter is so tiny that it can be fully described by
very few parameters.
Unfortunately, none of the mainstream versions of the interpretation of quantum mechanics
(i.e., those not invoking hidden variables) are anywhere presented in a form that would
satisfy our conclusion (S3). Since the deficiency always has the same root – the treatment
of the density operator as representing a state of incomplete knowledge, a statistical mixture
of pure states – it is enough to discuss one specific interpretation. We shall look at the
interpretation given in the very influential treatise of theoretical physics by Landau &
Lifshitz [33, 34]. They start their discussion of quantum mechanics with a particular
version of Born’s rule:
[33, p.6] ”The basis of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics lies in the propo-
sition that the state of a system can be described by a definite (in general complex) function
Ψ(q) of the coordinates. The square of the modulus of this function determines the probabil-
ity distribution of the values of the coordinates: |Ψ2|dq is the probability that a measurement
performed on the system will find the values of the coordinates to be in the element dq of
configuration space. The function Ψ is called the wave function of the system. [...] If the
wave function is known at some initial instant, then, from the very meaning of the concept
of complete description of a state, it is in principle determined at every succeeding instant.”
Thus in terms of our formal core, the complete description of the system is declared by
Landau & Lifshitz to be a pure state, and the properties of the system are declared to be
the probabilities of potential measurement results. They then consider parts (subsystems)
and observe:
[33, p.7] ”Let us consider a system composed of two parts, and suppose that the state of this
system is given in such a way that each of its parts is completely described.†”
Footnote: ”† This, of course, means that the state of the whole system is completely de-
scribed also. However, we emphasize that the converse statement is by no means true: a
complete description of the state of the whole system does not in general completely deter-
mine the states of its individual parts”
Thus they explicitly deny (S3). In fact, except in the special case discussed in the context of
the above quote – where the state factors into a tensor product of states of the subsystems
– they do not indicate at all how the state of a system and that of its parts are related. More
mysteriously, nowhere in the literature seems to be a discussion that would tell us anything
on the formal level about the relationship between the pure state of a system and the pure
state of a subsystem. There seems to be no such relation, except in the idealized, separable
case mentioned above, usually assumed to be valid only before an interaction happens.
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But this would mean that the quantum state of a physics lab has nothing to do with the
quantum states of the equipment in it, and of the particles probed there! This is very strange
for a science such as physics that studies large systems primarily by decomposing them into
its simple constituents and infers properties of the former from collective properties of the
latter.
This truly unacceptable situation shows that there is something deeply wrong with the
traditional interpretations.20 It is no surprise that this leads to counterintuitive paradoxes
in situations – such as experiments with entangled photons – where a larger (e.g., 2-photon)
system is prepared but its constituents (here 2 single photons) are observed.
Of course, we can never know the exact quantum state of a physics lab or a piece of
equipment. Because of that it has become respectable to interpret quantum mechanics
not in terms of what is but in terms of what is known to the person modeling a physical
system. The system state then becomes a complete description no longer of the physical
system but of the knowledge available.21 Uncertainty about the pure state is then modeled
as a probability distribution for being in a pure state. Averaging with corresponding weight
leads to more general mixed states described by density operators. In this context, Landau
& Lifshitz write:
[34, p.16] ”The quantum-mechanical description based on an incomplete set of data concern-
ing the system is effected by means of what is called a density matrix [...] The incompleteness
of the description lies in the fact that the results of various kinds of measurement which
can be predicted with a certain probability from a knowledge of the density matrix might
be predictable with greater or even complete certainty from a complete set of data for the
system, from which its wave function could be derived.”
Based on this, they derive the interpretation of the q-expectation 〈A〉 := Tr ρA as the
expectation value of A in a mixed state ρ:
[34, p.17] ”The change from the complete to the incomplete quantum-mechanical description
of the subsystem may be regarded as a kind of averaging over its various ψ states. [...] the
mean value f becomes the trace (sum of diagonal elements) of this operator”
However, on the next page they call their description an illustration only, denying it any
trace of reality:
[34, p.18] ”It must be emphasised that the averaging over various ψ states, which we
have used in order to illustrate the transition from a complete to an incomplete quantum-
mechanical description, has only a very formal significance. In particular, it would be quite
20In addition, there are the traditional difficulties of interpretations of quantum mechanics, well summa-
rized in Section 3.7 of the quantum mechanics textbook by Weinberg [62].
21Whose knowledge this is is usually not addressed; presumably it is the knowledge of the person creating
the mathematical model of the quantum system. Taken at face value, this would make the system state a
function of the mental state of the modeler’s mind – another truly unacceptable situation.
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incorrect to suppose that the description by means of the density matrix signifies that the
subsystem can be in various ψ states with various probabilities and that the averaging is
over these probabilities. Such a treatment would be in conflict with the basic principles of
quantum mechanics.
The states of a quantum-mechanical system that are described by wave functions are some-
times called pure states, as distinct from mixed states, which are described by a density
matrix. Care should, however, be taken not to misunderstand the latter term in the way
indicated above.
The averaging by means of the statistical matrix according to (5.4) has a twofold nature.
It comprises both the averaging due to the probabilistic nature of the quantum description
(even when as complete as possible) and the statistical averaging necessitated by the in-
completeness of our information concerning the object considered. For a pure state only the
first averaging remains, but in statistical cases both types of averaging are always present. It
must be borne in mind, however, that these constituents cannot be separated; the whole av-
eraging procedure is carried out as a single operation,and cannot be represented as the result
of successive averagings, one purely quantum-mechanical and the other purely statistical.”
Thus Landau and Lifschitz reject the subjective, knowledge-based view, as one cannot
divide the information contained in the density operator into an objective, pure part cor-
responding to the objective properties of the system and a statistical part accounting for
lack of knowledge.
But this also means that their derivation of the interpretation of the q-expectation 〈A〉 :=
Tr ρA as expectation value is invalid, being based on an invalid illustration only. Note that
this formula is heavily used in quantum statistical mechanics and quantum field theory.
It is often applied there in contexts where no measurement at all is involved and when
it is not even clear how one should measure the operators in question.22 Indeed, most of
quantum statistical mechanics is not concerned with measurement at all. In all these cases
the connection to measurement and hence to Born’s rule is absent, and even the hand-
waving ”illustrative” derivation given is spurious, as the items going into the derivation are
never actually measured.
On the other hand, the use of the density operator is central to quantum statistical me-
chanics. The fact that the latter predicts qualitatively and quantitatively the thermody-
namics of macroscopic systems shows that the density operator contains objective,
knowledge-independent information, and is the true carrier of the state infor-
mation in quantum physics. This is one of the reasons why the description of the formal
core of quantum physics presented in Subsection 2.1 featured the density operator as ba-
sic. Pure states then appear as idealizing approximation under the conditions discussed in
Subsection 2.2.
It is very remarkable that thermodynamics provides an alternative interpretation of the
22We mentioned already in Subsection 3.3 the problems with interpreting measurements of the energy,
corresponding to the operator H figuring in all of quantum statistical mechanics.
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q-expectation 〈A〉 := Tr ρA – not as as expectation value, but as the macroscopic, approx-
imately measured value of A. This is the germ of the thermal interpretation of quantum
physics to be discussed in Part II [40].
3.6 Pure states in quantum field theory
That pure states cannot have a fundamental meaning can also be seen from the perspective
of quantum field theory. It is a very little known fact that, in any interacting relativistic
quantum field theory, the notion of a pure state loses its meaning. Results from algebraic
quantum field theory (cf. Yngvason [71, p.12]) imply that all local algebras induced by a
relativistic quantum field theory on a causal diamond (an intersection of a future cone and
a past cone with nonempty interior) are factors of type III1 in von Neumann’s classification
of factors as refined by Connes [14]. Picking such a causal diamond containing our present
planetary system implies that we may assume the algebra of observables currently accessible
to mankind to be such a factor of type III1. Remarkably, such a C
∗-algebra A has no pure
states [71, p.14].23 Therefore, in these representations, one cannot rigorously argue about
states by considering partial traces in nonexistent pure states! This shows that pure states
must be the result of a major approximating simplification, and not something fundamental.
Note that A has infinitely many unitarily inequivalent irreducible representations on Hilbert
spaces (corresponding to the different superselection sectors of the theory). But in each such
representation, the algebra A of bounded q-observables is vanishingly small compared to
the algebra of all bounded operators. A vector state in the Hilbert space H of an irreducible
representation of a local algebra A of type III1 (which is a pure state in H) can therefore
still be mixed as a state of A.24 The vector state is guaranteed to be pure only relative to
the algebra of all bounded operators on H. But this algebra is far bigger than the algebra
A, and contains lots of operators that have no interpretation as q-observables. This is the
essential difference to the case of type I algebras, realizable in a Fock space, which have
many pure states. These algebras are the local algebras of free quantum field theories, and
only encode systems of noninteracting particles.
Thus what breaks down in quantum field theory is the simple equation ”q-observable =
self-adjoint Hermitian linear operator”. Once this equation is broken, the question whether
a state is pure becomes dependent on the precise specification of which operators are q-
observables. In gauge theories the situation is further complicated by the fact that the local
23An explicit example of a factor of type III1 involving an infinite array of spin-1/2 particles is given in
equations (27) and (29) of Yngvason [71].
24For example, for an arbitrary mixed state of a Hilbert space H0, the GNS construction produces another
Hilbert space in which this state is pure. Note that in quantum physics, the GNS construction is of limited
value only, as this Hilbert space depends on the state one started with, while standard quantum mechanics
works with pure states contained in a fixed Hilbert space. One therefore needs a distinguished state to
define a Hilbert space. Now the only distinguished state in quantum field theory is the vacuum state.
But for gauge theories such as quantum electrodynamics, the Hilbert space corresponding to this vacuum
representation does not contain any charged state!
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algebras have a nontrivial center consisting of charges that in each irreducible representation
are represented trivially. Thus a single irreducible representation on a single Hilbert space
(corresponding to a single superselection sector) is no longer sufficient to characterize the
complete algebra of local q-observables.
To give up the assumption that every bounded self-adjoint operator is a q-observable has
serious consequences for the interpretation of quantum physics. Indeed, a test for a pure
state is in terms of q-observables an observation of the orthogonal projector to the subspace
spanned by the state. If this is not a q-observable then it is in principle impossible to make
this test. Thus testing for being in a pure state is impossible, since these are no longer
physical propositions.
So one cannot decide whether a system is in a pure state. To assume this is thus a meta-
physical act, and one can dispense with it without any loss of information. But then the
conventional form of Born’s rule hangs in the air, and all traditional interpretations break
down completely, since they start with Born’s rule for pure states and derive everything
else from it.
4 Requirements for good foundations
The ordinary language, (spiced with technical jargon for the sake of conciseness) is thus insep-
arably united, in a good theory, with whatever mathematical apparatus is necessary to deal with
the quantitative aspects. It is only too true that, isolated from their physical context, the math-
ematical equations are meaningless: but if the theory is any good, the physical meaning which
can be attached to them is unique.
Leon Rosenfeld, 1957 [52, p.41]
I feel induced to contradict emphatically an opinion that Professor L. Rosenfeld has recently
uttered in a meeting at Bristol, to the effect that a mathematically fully developed, good and self-
consistent physical theory carries its interpretation in itself, there can be no question of changing
the latter, of shuffling about the concepts and formulae.
Erwin Schro¨dinger, 1958 [58, p.170]
A great physical theory is not mature until it has been put in a precise mathematical form, and
it is often only in such a mature form that it admits clear answers to conceptual problems.
Arthur Wightman, 1976 [66, p.158]
4.1 Foundations independent of measurement
to me it must seem a mistake to permit theoretical description to be directly dependent upon acts
of empirical assertions
Albert Einstein, 1949 [19]
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Measurement should not figure in the foundations of physics; the case for this was vividly
made by Bell [7]. The analysis in Section 3 indeed shows that actual measurement practice
is in conflict with the traditional foundations, due to a far too idealized view of measurement.
Thus we are lead to inquire how foundations independent of measurement could look like.
This can be studied by looking at the modern account of the oldest of the physical sciences,
Euclidean geometry.
For Euclidean geometry, considered as a branch of physics, there is a complete consensus
about how theory and reality correspond (on laboratory scales).
One first defines the corresponding calculus and names the quantities that can be calculated
from quantum mechanical models (or models of the theory considered) with the appropriate
names from experimental geometry. Thus, initially, a circle was a material object with a
round shape, and the mathematical circle was an abstraction of these.
The Pythagoreans (and later Descartes and Hilbert with even more precision) then devel-
oped a theory that gives a precise formal meaning to all the geometrical concepts. This is
pure mathematics, today encoded in textbook linear algebra and analytic geometry. The
theory and the nomenclature were developed with the goal of enabling this identification in
a way consistent with tradition.
Starting with Plato, the theory took precedence, defining the perfect concept. What was
found in reality was viewed as an approximate, imperfect realization of the theoretical
concept.
This was done by declaring anything in real life resembling an ideal point, line, plane, circle,
etc., to be a point, line, plane, circle, etc., if and only if it can be assigned in an approximate
way (determined by the heuristics of traditional measurement protocols, whatever they are)
the properties that the ideal point, line, plane, circle, etc., has, consistent to the assumed
accuracy with the deductions from the theory. If the match is not good enough, we can
explore whether an improvement can be obtained by modifying measurement protocols
(devising more accurate instruments or more elaborate error-reducing calculation schemes,
etc.) or by modifying the theory (to a non-Euclidean geometry, say, which uses the same
concepts but assumes slightly different properties relating them).
No significant philosophical problems are left; lucent, intuitive, and logically impeccable
foundations for Euclidean geometry have been established in this way. This indicates the
maturity of Euclidean geometry as a scientific discipline.
Thus once the theory is mature, the identification with real life is done in terms of the
formal, purely mathematical theory developed, giving an interpretation to the theory. In
this way, physics inherits the clarity of mathematics, the art and science of precise concepts
and relations.
In particular, with the Lagrangian and Hamiltonian formulations, classical mechanics has
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also reached the status of maturity, and hence is perceived by most physicists as clear and
philosophically unproblematic.
To define quantum physics (or any other physical theory) properly, including a logically im-
peccable interpretation, one should therefore proceed as in Euclidean geometry and classical
mechanics.
One first needs to define the corresponding calculus; this has already been done in Section
2.1. Then one has to name the quantities that can be calculated from quantum mechanical
models (or models of the theory considered) with the appropriate names the experimental
physicists use for organizing their data.
One can then develop a theory that gives a precise formal meaning to the concepts physicists
talk about. This is pure mathematics – the shut-up-and-calculate part of quantum physics.
Finally, an interpretation to the theory, i.e., the identification with real life, is given in
terms of the formal theory developed by means of
(CC) Callen’s criterion: Operationally, a system is in a given state if its properties are
consistently described by the theory for this state.
This generalizes the way H.B. Callen justified phenomenological equilibrium thermodynam-
ics in his famous textbook (Callen [12]), where he writes on p.15: ”Operationally, a system
is in an equilibrium state if its properties are consistently described by thermodynamic the-
ory.” At first sight, this sounds like a circular definition (and indeed Callen classifies it as
such). But a closer look shows there is no circularity since the formal meaning of ’consis-
tently described by thermodynamic theory’ is already known. The operational definition
simply moves this formal meaning from the domain of theory to the domain of reality by
defining when a real system deserves the designation ’is in an equilibrium state’. In partic-
ular, this definition allows one to determine experimentally whether or not a system is in
equilibrium.
For quantum physics, Callen’s criterion implies that we declare anything in real life resem-
bling an ideal photon, electron, atom, molecule, crystal, ideal gas, etc., to be a photon,
electron, atom, molecule, crystal, ideal gas, etc., if and only if it can be assigned in an ap-
proximate way (determined by the heuristics of traditional measurement protocols, what-
ever that is) the properties that the ideal photon, electron, atom, molecule, crystal, ideal
gas, etc., has, consistent to the assumed accuracy with the deductions from the theory.
This identification process is fairly independent of the way measurements are done, as long
as they are capable to produce the required accuracy for the matching, hence carries no
serious philosophical difficulties.
Of course, any successful theory must be crafted in such a way that it actually applies to
reality – otherwise the observed properties cannot match the theoretical description. On
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the other hand, as the quote by Callen emphasizes, we already need the theory to
define precisely what it is that we observe.
As a result, theoretical concepts and experimental techniques complement each other in a
way that, if a theory is reaching maturity, it has developed its concepts to the point where
they are a good match to reality. We then say that:
(R) Something in real life ’is’ an instance of the theoretical concept if it matches the
theoretical description sufficiently well.
It is not difficult to check that this holds not only in physics but everywhere where we have
clear concepts about some aspect of reality.
If the match between theory and observation is not good enough, we can explore whether an
improvement can be obtained by modifying measurement protocols (devising more accurate
instruments or more elaborate error-reducing calculation schemes, etc.) or by modifying
the theory (to a hyper quantum physics, say, which uses the same concepts but assumes
slightly different properties relating them).
Having established informally that the theory is an appropriate model for the physical
aspects of reality, one can study the measurement problem rigorously on this basis: One
declares that a real detector (in the sense of a complete experimental arrangement includ-
ing the numerical postprocessing of raw results that gives the final result) performs a real
measurement of an ideal quantity if and only if the following holds: Modeling the real
detector as a macroscopic quantum system (with the properties assigned to it by statisti-
cal mechanics/thermodynamics) predicts raw measurements such that, in the model, the
numerical postprocessing of raw results that gives the final result is in sufficient agreement
with the value of the ideal quantity in the model.
Then measurement analysis is a scientific activity like any other rather than a philosophical
prerequisite for setting up a consistently interpreted quantum physics. Indeed, this is the
way high precision experiments are designed and analyzed in practice.
4.2 What is a measurement?
Good foundations including a good measurement theory should be able to properly jus-
tify this informal consensus by defining additional formal concepts about what constitutes
measurement. To be satisfying, these must behave within the theory just as their informal
relatives with the same name behave in reality. Then instrument builders may use the the-
ory to inform themselves of what can possibly work, and instrument calibration assumes
the laws of physics to hold.
Thus measurement must be grounded in theory, not – as in the traditional foundations
– the other way round! In complete foundations, there would be formal objects in the
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mathematical theory corresponding to all informal objects discussed by physicists, including
those used when designing and performing measurements. Only then talking about the
formal objects and talking about the real objects is essentially isomorphic. We are currently
far from such complete foundations.
To understand the precise meaning of the notion of measurement we look at measurement in
the context of classical physics and chemistry. There are two basic kinds of measurements,
destructive measurements and nondestructive measurements.
Nondestructive measurements either leave the state of the object measured unchanged
(such as in the measurement of the length of a macroscopic object) or modify it temporarily
during the measurement (e.g., temporarily deforming it to measure the stiffness) in such a
way that the object returns to its original state after the measurement is completed. De-
structive measurements permanently change the state of the object measured, usually
by destroying all or part of it during the measurement process. Examples are the deter-
mination of the age of an archeological artifact by dendrochronology, or many traditional
methods of finding the chemical composition of a material.
In both cases, the measurement gives some posterior information about the prior state,
i.e., the state of the object before the start of the measurement process. In case of destruc-
tive measurements, it also gives some information about the products of the destruction,
from which properties of the prior states are deduced by reasoning.
A characteristic context of destructive measurements is the presence of a large, sufficiently
homogeneous object. Tiny parts of it are subjected to destructive measurements to discover
their relevant properties. The homogeneity of the object then implies that the properties
deduced from the destructive measurements are also properties of the remainder of the
object. Thus destructive measurements of a tiny fraction of a homogeneous object give
information about the whole object, including its unmeasured part. By our definition, we
obtain in this way a nearly nondestructive measurement of the whole object.
Alternatively, a large number of essentially identical objects are present, a few of which are
subjected to a destructive measurement. The results of the measurement are then taken as
being representative of the properties of the unmeasured objects. In case the measurements
on the objects measured do not agree, one can still make statistical statements about the
unmeasured objects, approximately valid within the realm of validity of the law of large
numbers. However, this no longer gives valid information about a single unmeasured object,
but only information about the whole population of unmeasured objects. Thus one may
regard the measurement on multiple trial objects as a measurement of the state of the whole
population.
Based on this analysis we conclude:
(M) A property P of a system S (encoded in its state) has been measured by another
system, the detector D, if at the time of completion of the measurement and a short time
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thereafter (long enough that the information can be read by an observer) the detector state
carries enough information about the state of the measured system S at the time when the
measurement process begins to deduce with sufficient reliability the validity of property P
at that time.
4.3 Beables
The scientist [...] appears as realist insofar as he seeks to describe a world independent of
the acts of perception; as idealist insofar as he looks upon the concepts and theories as the
free inventions of the human spirit (not logically derivable from what is empirically given); as
positivist insofar as he considers his concepts and theories justified only to the extent to which
they furnish a logical representation of relations among sensory experiences. He may even appear
as Platonist or Pythagorean insofar as he considers the viewpoint of logical simplicity as an
indispensable and effective tool of his research. [original bold preserved]
Albert Einstein, 1949 [19]
One of the basic problems with the traditional interpretations of quantum mechanics is the
difficulty to specify precisely what counts as real. The physics before 1926 was explicitly
about discovering and objectively describing the true, reliably repeatable features of nature,
seen as objectively real.
After the establishment of modern quantum physics, the goal of physics can (according
to the traditional interpretations of quantum mechanics) only be much more modest, to
systematically describe what physicists measure. Nonetheless, physics continues to make
objective claims about reality that existed long before a physicist performed the first mea-
surement, such as the early history of the universe, the composition of distant stars and
galaxies of which we can measure not more than tiny specks of light, the age of ancient arti-
facts dated by the radio carbon method. Physics also makes definite statements about the
distant future of our solar systems – independent of anyone being then around to measure
it.
Thus there is a fundamental discrepancy between what one part of physics claims and what
the traditional interpretations of quantum mechanics allows one to claim. This discrep-
ancy was discussed in a paper by Bell [6], where he writes that quantum mechanics ”is
fundamentally about the results of ’measurements’, and therefore presupposes in addition
to the ’system’ (or object) a ’measurer’ (or subject). [...] the theory is only approximately
unambiguous, only approximately self-consistent. [...] it is interesting to speculate on the
possibility that a future theory will not be intrinsically ambiguous and approximate. Such a
theory could not be fundamentally about ’measurements’, for that would again imply incom-
pleteness of the system and unanalyzed interventions from outside. Rather it should again
become possible to say of a system not that such and such may be observed to be so but
that such and such be so. The theory would not be about ’observables’ but about ’beables’.
These beables [...] should, on the macroscopic level, yield an image of the everyday classical
world, [...] the familiar language of everyday affairs, including laboratory procedures, in
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which objective properties – beables – are assigned to objects.”
To find beables we note that the problems created by quantum mechanics are absent in
classical mechanics. Thus it seems that classical objects exist in the sense that they
have objective properties that qualify as beables. The classical regime is usually identified
with macroscopic physics, where length and time scales are long enough that the classical
approximation of quantum mechanics is accurate enough to be useful. This suggests that
we look at the visible parts of quantum experiments.
Most experiments done to probe the foundations of quantum physics are done using optical
devices. In quantum optics experiments, both sources and beams are extended macroscopic
objects describable by quantum field theory and statistical mechanics. For example, a laser
beam is simply a coherent state of the quantized electromagnetic field, concentrated in a
neighborhood of a line segment in space.
The sources have properties independent of measurement, and the beams have properties
independent of measurement. These are objects described by quantum field theory. For
example, the output of a laser (before or after parametric down conversion or any other
optical processing) is a laser beam, or an arrangement of highly correlated beams. These
are in a well-defined state that can be probed by experiment. If this is done, they are
always found to have the properties ascribed to them by the preparation procedure. One
just needs sufficient time to collect the information needed for a quantum state tomography.
The complete state is measurable in this way, reproducibly, to any given accuracy.
Neither the state of the laser nor of the beam is changed by one or more measurements
at the end of the beam. Moreover, these states can be found to any desired accuracy by
making sufficiently long and varied measurements of the beam; how this is done is discussed
in quantum optics under the name of quantum tomography.
Thus these properties exist independent of any measurement – just as the moon exists even
when nobody is looking at it. They can be found through diligent measurement, just as
properties of distant stars and galaxies. They behave in every qualitative respect just like
classical properties of classical objects.
On the other hand, measuring individual particles is an erratic affair, and unless experiments
are specially tuned (”non-demolition measurements”) they change the state of the individual
particles in an unpredictable way, so that – like in a classical destructive measurement –
their precise state before measurement can never be ascertained. Only probabilities for
their collective behavior can be given by averaging over many observations of different
realizations.
For example, the analysis of experimental particle collisions is based on measuring the
momentum and charge of many individual collision products. But individual collision events
(the momentum and charge of the individual collision products) are not predicted by the
theory – only the possibilities and their collective statistics, their distribution in a collection
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of equally prepared events. Indeed, probabilities mean nothing for a single collision. What
does it mean that the particular collision event recorded at a particular time in a particular
place is obtained with probability 0.07? Nothing at all; the single simply happened and has
no associated probability. A statement about probabilities is always a statement about a
process that can be repeated many times under essentially identical conditions.
Thus we have found a class of beables: the densities, intensities, and correlation functions
used to describe optical fields. And we have found a class of non-beables: the individual
particles. The beables are computable from quantum statistical mechanics and quantum
field theory as expectations – not as eigenvalues of q-observables! They are associated with
quantum statistical mechanics and quantum field theory on the level of fields – not on the
level of individual particles.
Therefore, sources and beams are much more real than particles. The former, not the latter,
must be the real players in solid foundations.
The goal of fundamental physics to understand things at the smallest scales possible resulted
in quantum field theory, where fields, not particles, play the fundamental role. Particles
appear only as asymptotic excitations of the fields. Quantum field theory (or perhaps an
underlying theory such as string theory of which quantum field theory is an approximation)
is supposed to determine the behavior at all scales, and hence lead to insights into the world
at large.
Indeed, as we have seen, the basis of our perception of an objective reality is statistical
mechanics and field theory – not few-particle quantum mechanics! The inappropriate focus
on the particle aspect of quantum mechanics created the appearance of mystery; common
sense is restored by focussing instead on the field aspect.
The deeper reason for this is that from a fundamental point of view, the particle concept
is a derived, approximate concept derived from the more basic concept of an interacting
relativistic quantum field theory. The quantum particle concept makes mathematical sense
only under very special circumstances, namely in those where a system actually behaves
like particles do – when they can be considered as being essentially free, as before and after
a scattering event in a dilute gas or a particle collider ring. The particle concept makes
intuitive sense only under the same circumstances. (This is discussed in more detail in Part
III [41] of this series of papers.)
We conclude from our discussion that
(F) Fields are real and have associated beables, given by expectation values.
Conclusion (F) is one of the basic assumptions of the thermal interpretation of quantum
physics to be discussed in Part II [40] of this series of papers. It is routinely used in
equilibrium and nonequilibrium statistical thermodynamics (see, e.g., Calzetta & Hu
[13]).
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However, quite early in the history of modern quantum physics, Ehrenfest [18] found a
clean and exact relation between the dynamical laws of classical mechanics and quantum
mechanics. The Ehrenfest equation25 states that
d
dt
〈A〉t = 〈H ∠A〉t, (4)
where 〈·〉t is the expectation in the state at time t and
H ∠A :=
i
h¯
[H,A]. (5)
The implication for the interpretation of quantum physics (to be discussed in Part II [40])
seem to have gone unnoticed in the literature, probably because of the very strong tradition
that placed an unreasonable notion of quantum measurement at the very basis of quantum
physics.
4.4 What is a particle?
The preceding featured beams of light, conventionally associated with massless particles,
the photons, and showed that the beams themselves are far more real than the photons
that they are suposed to contain.
An independent indication of the unreal status of photons is provided by an analysis of the
photoelecric effect, that faint coherent laser light falling on a photosensitive plate causes
randomly placed detection events following a Poisson distribution. Conventionally, this
effect is ascribed to the particle nature of light, and each detection event is taken as a proof
that a photon arrived. Upon closer analysis, however, the detection events are found to be
artifacts caused by the quantum nature of the photosensitive plate. This must be the case
because the analysis can be done in a model of the process in which no photons exist. Such
an analysis is done, e.g., in Sections 9.1-9.5 of Mandel & Wolf [35], a standard reference
for quantum optics. It is a proof that detection events happen in the detector without
photons being present. Hence one cannot tell from a detection event whether the cause
was a photon or a classical field. But if the detectors cannot even distinguish an external
classical field from an impinging photon in the theoretical analysis, based on which analysis
should an experimentor decide?
In the model, the electron field of the detector responds to a classical external electro-
magnetic radiation field by emitting electrons according to Poisson-law probabilities. Thus
the quantum detector produces discrete Poisson-distributed clicks, although the source is
completely continuous. The state space of this quantum system consists of multi-electron
25It is a pity that Ehrenfest did not develop this equation to the point where it would have amounted to
an interpretation of quantum physics. This could have avoided a lot of the subsequent confusion.
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states only. Thus the multi-electron system (followed by a macroscopic decoherence process
that leads to the multiple localization of the emitted electron field) is responsible for the
creation of the discrete detection pattern.26
Quantum electrodynamics is of course needed to explain special quantum effects of light
revealed in modern experiments, but not for the photoelectric effect. Indeed, finer analysis
reveals that beams in nonclassical states may give a counting statistics significantly different
from that of the classical analysis. But this only shows that the beam description needs
quantum field theory (where people conventionally use the language of photons), not that
there must be actual particles called photons.
It may seem, however, that the reality of individual massive particles is established beyond
doubt through the observation of particle tracks in bubble chambers and other path-tracking
devices. But are the observed ”tracks” guaranteed to be traces of particles?
The paper by Schirber [54] discusses essentially the same phenomenon in a fully classical
context, where a bullet is fired into a sheet of glass and produces a large number of radial
cracks in random directions. This is shown in the first figure there, whose caption says,
”The number of cracks produced by a projectile hitting a glass sheet provides information
on the impactor’s speed and the properties of the sheet.” In the main text, we read ”A
projectile traveling at 22.2 meters per second generates four cracks in a 1-millimeter-thick
sheet of Plexiglas. [...] A 56.7 meter-per-second projectile generates eight radial cracks
in the same thickness Plexiglass sheet as above.” (See also Falcao & Parisio [20] and
Vandenberghe & Villermaux [60].)
We see that the discrete, random detection events (the cracks) are a manifestation of broken
symmetry when something impacts a material that – unlike water – cannot respond in a
radially symmetric way. Randomness is inevitable in the breaking of a radial symmetry into
discrete events. The projectile creates an outgoing spherical stress wave in the plexiglas
and produces straight cracks. In fact, once i nitiated, the growth of a crack in a solid is
not very different from the growth of a track in a bubble chamber, except that the energies
and time scales are quite different. Only the initiation is random.
Would observed tracks in a high energy collision energy experiment prove without doubt
the existence of particles, one would have to conclude that the projectile contains ”crack
particles” whose number is a function of the energy of the projectile – just as the number
of photons in a laser beam is a function of its energy, and the number of events produced
by a laser beam hitting a photodetector provides information on the impactor’s brightness.
Only the details are different.
Therefore the number of discrete detection events cannot be regarded as obvious evidence
26This was already clearly expressed in 1924 by Jeans [27], who writes on p. 80: ”The fundamental law
of quantum-dynamics, that radiant energy is emitted and absorbed only in complete quanta, is no longer
interpreted as meaning that the ether can carry radiant energy only in complete quanta, but that matter
can deliver or absorb radiant energy only by complete quanta.”
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for the existence of the same number of associated invisible objects. They are at best
evidence of the impact of something.
How do we know whether the tracks in a bubble chamber do not have a similar origin?
In both cases (bullet tracks and tracks in a bubble chamber), something impinging on
the detector produces a collection of lines or curves. While the details are different, the
mechanism is the same. In each case one has a macroscopic and very complicated process
that breaks the symmetry and produces tracklike events. Thus there is no a priori reason
why in one case but not the other the lines should be interpreted as evidence of particles.
It is strange that tradition says that in the classical experiment with the bullet we see broken
symmetry due to microscopic uncertainty, whereas in a bubble chamber we see irreducible
quantum randomness.
Tracks in a bubble chamber are also a manifestation of broken symmetry when a radially
symmetric alpha-particle field produced by a radioactive nucleus impacts a bubble chamber.
A famous paper by Mott [36] (see also Figari & Teta [21, 15]) explains in detail how
in a bubble chamber complete particle tracks appear in random directions because of the
discrete quantum nature of the bubble chamber – nowhere is made use of the particle
nature of the impacting radial wave! Thus while the details are quantum mechanical, the
underlying principle is classical!
What we see in a bubble chamber are droplets condensing due to ionization caused by
a local piece of a spherical wave emanating from a radioactive nucleus. Mott analyzes
the impact of the spherical wave and proceeds without reference to anything outside the
quantum formalism. He shows (p.80) that, in the absence of a deflecting magnetic field, the
atoms cannot both be ionized unless they lie in a nearly straight line with the radioactive
nucleus. There is no direct reference to the α particle causing the ionizations.
Mott’s analysis suggests that after the collision the scattered part forms a spherical wave
(and not particles flying in different directions) until the wave reaches the detector. The
spherical wave is nowhere replaced by flying particles. This makes his analysis very close to
a field theoretical treatment. Particles appear to be ghostlike and only macroscopic (hence
field-like) things are observed.
Mott needs Born’s rule only for interpreting the final outcome in terms of probabilities
and finds it consistent with a distribution of straight path only. This fully explains the
tracks, without making any claims about position measurements or particle pointer states
or collapse assumptions.
Everything said in this and the prededing subsection supports the view that, except during
the detection event, particles are unreal in the sense of having no associated beables, and
that they have a shade of reality only as identical realizations of a population.
This conclusion that particles are unreal and have meaning only during measurement or
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figuratively as part of a population is also reflected in the statistical interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics championed by Ballentine [4, Chapter 9], who denies that a single system
has a state, and instead assigns the state to a population of similarly prepared systems: He
writes on p.240: ”regard the state operator ρ as the fundamental description of the state
generated by the thermal emission process, which yields a population of systems each of
which is a single electron”. Thus he gives reality (beable properties) to the preparation
procedure, – to the beam –, but not to the electrons (which do not even have a state).
Slightly more indirectly, this is also reflected in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum
mechanics, some versions of which say27that an unmeasured system has no position, hence
(in terms of beables) is unreal.
We conclude that the lack of reality of quantum particles is well supported by the literature,
in different ways. In contrast to (F) from Subsection 4.3, and in view of the Copenhagen
interpretation, we may rephrase our findings as follows:
(P) Particles do not exist except when measured. They are detection events created by the
detector and mediated by fields.
What exists are the beams, and the discrete effects they produce when subjected to measure-
ment. This is an intuitive picture completely orthogonal to the traditional interpretations
of quantum mechanics.
It is a historical accident that one continues to use the name particle in the many microscopic
situations where it is grossly inappropriate if one thinks of it with the classical meaning of
a tiny bullet moving through space. Restrict the use of the particle concept to where it is
appropriate, or do not think of particles as ”objects” – in both cases all mystery is gone,
and the foundations become fully rational.
5 Outlook: New foundations
In the present paper, the universally accepted formal core of quantum physics was cleanly
separated from the controversial interpretation issues. Moreover, it was shown that Born’s
rule, usually considered a findamental, exact property of nature, has – like most other law
of nature – its limitations, and cannot be regarded as a fundamental law.
Based on this insight, the other parts of this series of papers present a new view of the
27This goes back to Heisenberg[23], who states on p.176: ”However, a single photon of such light is
enough to eject the electron completely from its ’path’ (so that only a single point of such a path can be
defined). Therefore here the word ’path’ has no definable meaning.” ( ”Von solchem Licht aber genu¨gt
ein einziges Lichtquant, um das Elektron vo¨llig aus seiner ’Bahn’ zu werfen (weshalb von einer solchen
Bahn immer nur ein einziger Raumpunkt definiert werden kann), das Wort ’Bahn’ hat hier also keinen
vernu¨nftigen Sinn.”) And on p.185 he states that the ’path’ comes into being only when we observe it”
(”Die ’Bahn’ entsteht erst dadurch, daß wir sie beobachten”).
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foundations for quantum mechanics (QM) and quantum field theory (QFT). This section
puts the results of Parts II–V [40, 41, 42, 43] into perspective, pointing to a coherent
quantum physics where classical and quantum thinking live peacefully side by side and
jointly fertilize the intuition.
5.1 The thermal interpretation
The insight that Born’s rule has its limitations and hence cannot be the foundation of quan-
tum physics opens the way for an alternative interpretation – the thermal interpretation of
quantum physics, defined and discussed in detail in Part II [40], Part III [41], and Part IV
[42]. It gives new foundations that connect quantum physics (including quantum mechanics,
statistical mechanics, quantum field theory and their applications) to experiment.
The new foundations improve the traditional foundations in several respects:
• The thermal interpretation is independent of the measurement problem. The latter
becomes a precise problem in statistical mechanics rather than a fuzzy and problematic
notion in the foundations.
• The thermal interpretation better reflects the actual practice of quantum physics, espe-
cially regarding its macroscopic implications.
• The thermal interpretation explains the peculiar features of the Copenhagen interpre-
tation (lacking realism between measurements) and the statistical interpretation (lacking
realism for the single case) in the microscopic world where the latter apply.
• The thermal interpretation explains the emergence of probabilities from the linear, deter-
ministic dynamics of quantum states or quantum observables.
• The thermal interpretation gives a fair account of the interpretational differences between
quantum mechanics and quantum field theory.
5.2 Questioning the traditional foundations in other respects
Traditionally, those learning quantum theory are expected to abandon classical thinking
and to learn thinking in a quantum mechanical framework completely different from that
of classical mechanics. Though students widely differ in the order in which this happens,
sooner or later, most of them are introduced to the items mentioned in the following cari-
cature.
• Typically, they are first told that the Bohr–Sommerfeld theory of quantization gave
(for that time) an exact explanation of the spectral lines for the hydrogen atom, firmly
establishing that Nature is quantized.
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• Then they are told that Bohr’s view is obsolete, and that it was just a happy (or even
misleading) coincidence that the old quantum theory worked for hydrogen.
• Therefore, they are next acquainted with wave functions on configuration space, their
inner product, and the resulting Hilbert spaces of square integrable wave functions.
But almost immediately, unnormalizable wave functions are used that do not belong
to the Hilbert space.
• They are then told with little intuitive guidance (except for a vague postulated cor-
respondence principle that cannot be made to work in many cases) that in quantum
mechanics, observables are replaced by Hermitian operators on this Hilbert space.
• Later they may (or may not) learn that many of these operators are not even defined
on the Hilbert space but only on a subspace.
• In particular, they are told that particles have no definite position or momentum,
but that these miraculously get random values when measured, due to a postulated
collapse of the wave function that prepares the system in a new pure position or
momentum state (which does not exist since it is unnormalized).
• Now they must swallow a mysterious law defining the distribution of these random
values, called Born’s rule. It is justified by the remark that it is proved by (the Stern–
Gerlach) experiment. But Born’s rule is claimed to hold for all conceivable quantum
measurements, although this experiment neither demonstrates the measurement of
position nor of momentum or other important quantities.
• They must then learn that between measurements, position and momentum and hence
well-defined paths do not exist. This leaves unexplained how the Stern–Gerlach screen
can possibly find out that a particle arrived to be measured. The Stern–Gerlach device
and all of quantum mechanics begins to look like magic.
• Then they are taught the connection to classical physics by establishing the Ehrenfest
theorem for expectation values that obey approximately classical laws. Although well-
defined paths do not exist, the system miraculously has at all times a well-defined
mean path, even when not measured.
• As a result, classical and quantum physics appear like totally separated realms with
totally different concepts and tools, connected only by a rough-and-ready notion of
correspondence that is ambiguous and never made precise but works in a few key
cases (and always with liberally enough usage).
• After considerable time, when they have some experience with spectral calculations,
they learn how to use group theory (or, for those with only little algebra background,
spherical harmonics – rotation group representation tools in disguise) to determine
the spectrum for hydrogen. Miraculously, the results are identical with those obtained
by Bohr.
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• At a far later stage, they meet (if at all) coherent states for describing laser light, or
as a tool for a semiclassical understanding of the harmonic oscillator. Miraculously,
a coherent state happens to perform under the quantum dynamics exact classical
oscillations.
• Only few students will also meet coherent states for the hydrogen atom, the Berry
phase, Maslov indices, and the accompanying theory of geometric quantization, which
gives the (slightly corrected) Bohr–Sommerfeld rules for the spectrum a very re-
spectable place in the quantum theory of exactly solvable systems, even today relevant
for semiclassical approximations.
• Even fewer students realize that this implies that, after all, classical mechanics and
quantum mechanics are not that far apart. A development of quantum mechanics
emphasizing the closeness of classical mechanics and quantum mechanics can be found
in my online book, Neumaier & Westra [44].
Why does the conventional curriculum lead to such a strange state of affairs? Perhaps
this is the case because tradition builds the quantum edifice on a time-honored foundation
which accounts for essentially all experimental facts but takes a ”shut-up-and-calculate”
attitude with respect to the interpretation of the foundations. The traditional presentation
of quantum physics is clearly adequate for prediction but seems not to be suitable for an
adequate understanding.
5.3 Coherent quantum physics
Are coherent states the natural language of quantum
theory?
John Klauder, 1986 [30]
The conundrums of Subsection 5.2 are settled in Part V [43] through the development of
the concept of a coherent quantum physics that removes the radical split between classical
mechanics and quantum mechanics.
That this might be feasible is already suggested by the history of coherent states. (For
the early history of coherent states see, e.g., Nieto [47].) Already in 1926, at the very
beginning of modern quantum physics, coherent states were used by Schro¨dinger [57] to
demonstrate the closeness of classical and quantum mechanical descriptions of a physical
system. Schro¨dinger discussed the main properties of the coherent states today known
as Glauber coherent states. He did not call them coherent states, a notion coined in
1963 by Glauber [22]. Today the term coherent state denotes a variety of (in detail
very different) collections of states displaying simultaneously a classical and a quantum
character.
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Part V is also part of another series of papers (see Neumaier [38]) that develop a theory
of coherent spaces, in terms of which the notion of a Glauber coherent state is further
generalized. Together with the thermal interpretation from Part II, it serves as the basis
for new foundations for quantum physics in which classical and quantum thinking live
peacefully side by side and jointly fertilize the intuition. The fundamental importance of
coherent states is emphasized by defining a coherent quantum physics, based on the
concept of coherence in various forms, thereby rebuilding from scratch the foundations of
quantum physics. Summarizing the vision in the shortest terms, we may say:
• Coherent quantum physics is quantum physics in terms of a coherent space consisting of
a line bundle over a classical phase space and an appropriate ”coherent product” charac-
terizing the physical properties of a quantum system.
• The kinematical structure of quantum physics and the meaning of the q-observables are
given by the symmetries of this coherent space.
• The dynamics is given by von Neumann’s equation for the density operator.
• The connection to experiment is given through the thermal interpretation.
Coherent spaces reconcile the old (semiclassical, Bohr-style) thinking with the requirements
of the new (operator-base) quantum physics. They become the foundation on which a
better, coherent quantum physics is built. Mathematically, these foundations are equivalent
to the traditional Hilbert space approach. But conceptually, these foundations begin with
what is common between the classical and the quantum world.
The only miracles left in the new approach outlined in this paper are of a linguistic nature,
namely the coincidence that the same word ”coherence” fits several different contexts that
come together in the new foundations:
• spatio-temporal coherence, the meaning of the term in ”coherent states”,
• logical coherence, refering to mathematically sound foundations,
• intuitive coherence, implying that concepts make holistic sense to the intellect, and
• coherence as harmony, the meaning of the term in ”coherent configurations” and ”coherent
algebras”, concepts from the combinatorics of symmetry.28
28Coherent configurations and the associated coherent algebras were introduced in pure mathematics
around 1970 (by Higman [25, 26]), completely independent of physical considerations. Special classes of
coherent configurations called association schemes and distance-regular graphs are very well-studied,
and many interesting examples are known in detail.
Coherent configurations are, in a sense made precise in the companion paper [39], closely related to a finite
variant of coherent states. Just as semisimple Lie groups act as symmetry groups of associated Riemannian
symmetric spaces, and their representation theory leads to Perelomov coherent states, so most finite simple
groups act as symmetry groups of associated distance regular graphs. The latter is recorded in the book
by Brouwer et al. [11]), of which I am a coauthor. The book appeared just about the time when, for
completely different reasons, I turned to seriously study quantum physics.
Only much later, I realized the extent of the connection of that work to coherent states. The two subjects
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In the literature, one usually finds coherent states discussed just for themselves, or in
the context of the classical limit. However, they are also a powerful instrument in other
respects. The reason is that they have both a good intuitive semiclassical interpretation
and give good access to the whole Hilbert space (and beyond). Indeed, coherent quantum
physics turns coherent states into the fundamental tool for studying quantum physics.
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